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In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape 
Philip N.S. Rumney1 
INTRODUCTION 
In a previous issue of the Seattle Journal for Social Justice, Patricia 
Novotny discussed the issue of gender neutrality within rape statutes and its 
implications for women, men, and the relations between the two sexes.2  
Gender neutrality within rape statutes is the concept that the criminal law 
should recognize that both men and women can be rape victims as well as 
perpetrators.  Gender neutrality within rape reflects modern understandings 
of the nature, effects, and dynamics of nonconsensual penetrative sex acts, 
and is an evidence-led means of appropriately labeling criminal conduct.  
By contrast, Novotny argues that gender-neutral reforms raise a number of 
concerns and may have a number of negative consequences for female 
victims of rape.  Novotny takes issue with the growing recognition of male 
victimization3 and suggests that gender neutrality within rape might form 
part of a backlash against feminism:4 that it is a form of “gender disguise”;5 
that gender neutrality suggests men and women are equally victimized;6 that 
gender-neutral rape statutes may have undermined rape law reform;7 and 
that men and women “experience sexual assault differently.”8  Novotny’s 
article is underpinned by what appear to be theoretical objections to gender-
neutral rape statutes that are not grounded in the wider legal and social 
science literature.  This carries with it the attendant danger that theoretical 
objections to gender neutrality in rape will override the reality of male 
sexual victimization and its appropriate labeling by the criminal law.  
While I consider Novotny’s concerns over the “growing insistence that 
men can be victims [of rape and sexual assault]”9 as a starting point, I also 
address the arguments and criticisms used by other critics of the so-called 
“sexual democratisation of rape.”10  I draw upon the growing research 
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literature on male sexual victimization,11 as well as the experience of 
jurisdictions that have adopted gender-neutral definitions of rape as part of 
an analysis of the claims and concerns raised by the critics.   
In Section I, I define gender neutrality within the context of rape and 
examine the nature of gender-neutral rape statutes, including the reasons for 
their enactment.  In Section II, I analyze the wide range of concerns 
articulated by critics of gender neutrality.  In Section III, I present the 
argument that the criticisms directed toward general-neutral rape statutes 
are largely unwarranted and lack evidential support.  In addition, I highlight 
one of the weaknesses of theory-driven analysis in this area—that it does 
not take account of our growing understanding of male sexual victimization.  
Finally, I conclude by pointing out that the critics of gender-neutral rape 
statutes have misunderstood these reforms.  The critics argue that gender 
neutrality consists of ignoring issues of gender in rape when, in reality, this 
reform has been concerned with the appropriate labeling of criminal 
conduct and does not prevent the gendered analysis of rape.   
I. THE CONTOURS OF GENDER NEUTRALITY WITHIN RAPE 
 The concept of gender neutrality within rape has been influential 
over the last four decades in those jurisdictions that have engaged in 
significant reform of their rape and sexual assault laws.  The fundamental 
characteristic of gender-neutral reforms is that they expand the definition of 
rape to recognize male victims and female perpetrators.  Hence, they are 
“neutral,” but only in the sense of including both males and females as 
potential rapists and victims.  Gender-neutral reforms vary across the many 
different jurisdictions in which they have been introduced; in this section, I 
explain some of the various ways in which gender-neutral reforms define 
rape and sexual assault.  I will also consider the reasons that law reform 
bodies, legislators, and scholars have used to justify the introduction of 
gender-neutral rape statutes.  
     In Defence of Gender Neutrality Within Rape 483 
VOLUME 6 • ISSUE 1 • 2007 
Across dozens of jurisdictions, gender-neutral reforms have been adopted 
as part of a wider law reform agenda in an attempt to reflect a more modern 
understanding of the purpose of rape law—the protection of sexual 
autonomy from the harm of non-consensual penetrative sex acts.12  Scholars 
have criticized traditional rape laws that only proscribe penile-vaginal 
intercourse, arguing that these laws exclude “a great deal of behaviour 
which is remarkably similar to the act legally designated as rape and…such 
exclusion appears to rest on no logical or justifiable grounds.”13  This 
critique emphasizes the similarity in the physical or psychological trauma 
caused by non-consensual penetration of the vagina, anus, and mouth by the 
penis or other objects.14  Such criticism has been bolstered by the fact that 
traditional justifications for a narrowly defined actus reus in rape appear to 
have lost their persuasiveness.  
In 1984, the Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) argued that the 
English definition of rape, proscribing only non-consensual penile-vaginal 
intercourse, should be retained on the grounds that vaginal rape was 
“unique and grave.”15  In its previous working paper, the CLRC sought to 
distinguish penile-vaginal intercourse from other forms of penetration on 
the ground, inter alia, that penile-vaginal rape risks pregnancy.16  In 
response to such arguments, Jennifer Temkin has noted “[t]he fact that pre-
pubertal, menopausal, sterilized, and infertile women as well as those who 
practice contraception are all covered by the law of rape suggests that [the 
risk of pregnancy] is not of overriding significance [in the definition of 
rape].”17  Therefore, the move away from a narrow definition of rape 
reflects a realization that the historical justifications for its existence do not 
survive critical analysis.  
Male rape was first recognized under English law in 1994 when the 
definition of rape was revised so as to include non-consensual, penile-anal 
intercourse of a woman or a man.  A further extension to the definition 
resulted from a report of the Home Office Review of Sex Offences 
(hereinafter “the Review”).  In its report, the Review proposed that the 
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definition of rape be extended to include penile penetration of the mouth, a 
recommendation implemented into law by the Sexual Offences Act 2003.18  
The Review recommended this change based on the trauma that can be  
caused by such assaults.19  Additionally, the Review adopted an expanded 
definition of penetration that emphasized similarities among different forms 
of penile penetration of the body;20 notably, such emphasis has been a long-
standing justification for legal reform in this area.  In 1976, Jocelynne Scutt, 
writing about rape law reform in Michigan, argued that:  
A principle of criminal law is, surely, that all persons should be 
protected equally from harm of like degree. . . . The case for 
treating crimes of like heinousness similarly appears to be stronger 
than that calling for a distinction to be made between penetration 
of the female body and penetration of the male body, whatever the 
sex of the actor.21  
Thus, gender-neutral reforms have been viewed as a means of 
appropriately labeling conduct that is similar in nature and effect.    
The importance of appropriate labeling should not be underestimated.  
Feminist scholars have long recognized that it is important that female rape 
survivors be able to put an appropriate name or label to their experiences of 
abuse so as to undermine “the isolation of feeling that you are the only 
one.”22  In her analysis of findings from interviews with female victims of 
rape and sexual assault, Liz Kelly has stressed the significance of such 
naming in challenging the invisibility of male violence: “Lack of care in the 
terms we use to name forms of male violence can result in limited 
definitions which reinforce the public invisibility of much [of] the range of 
abusive behaviour men engage in . . . .”23  Recently, Stephanie Allen 
applied the concept of naming to male victims and noted that the lack of 
public acknowledgement of male rape has impacted the ability of victims to 
recognize their own victimization.  Allen quotes one male victim who was 
raped in the 1960s: “I knew it wasn’t right, because I felt so awful 
afterwards, but I didn’t know what it was because nobody had heard of 
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male rape in those days.”24  In recommending the adoption of an expanded 
gender-neutral definition of rape, the Republic of Ireland Law Reform 
Commission acknowledged a “consensus” that favored an expanded 
definition amongst groups working with victims:  
We attach considerable significance to the fact that these views are 
held by persons who are in daily contact with the victims of 
assaults and who are in a position to observe their use of language.  
We were also told by them that appropriate labeling of offences 
contributes to the victim’s sense of being vindicated and protected 
by the State and that any description which seems to understate the 
gravity of an offence or put it in a lesser category will be resented 
by the victim.25 
The idea of labeling or naming abusive acts as rape leads to another 
issue—the relationship between the lack of societal recognition of male 
rape and institutional neglect of the problem.  The historic failure of the 
legal process in most jurisdictions to recognize rape outside the male-on-
female paradigm may have also contributed to the failure of society to 
acknowledge male sexual victimization.  In the context of male rape, it has 
been argued that “[t]he general belief persists that either men cannot be 
raped, or if they are, so few men are raped that it becomes a freak 
occurrence.”26  This lack of acknowledgement can also lead to isolation 
amongst victims and contribute to a view that little needs to be realized in 
order to address the problem of rape outside the male-on-female paradigm.  
Similar problems exist in cases of sexual violence and abuse within the gay 
community; for example, Lori Girshick notes that: 
 The lesbian, bisexual, and gay communities have generally 
denied abuse, silenced victims, and protected abusers.  This loyalty 
to the community has made it difficult to expose the negative 
aspects of abusive same-sex relationships.  In fact, lesbians or 
bisexual women may blame survivors for their abuse rather than 
hold an abuser accountable, since this would require community 
acknowledgment of the abuse.27       
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Legal acknowledgement of such abuse may help to break down societal 
notions of denial and assist male and female victims in seeking support and 
legal redress.28  
Jurisdictions that have adopted gender-neutral laws include: Canada, all 
Australian states,29 the Republic of Ireland,30 Finland,31 England and 
Wales,32 and the vast majority of states within the United States.33  Gender-
neutral reforms, however, are not uniform in nature.  Some jurisdictions 
have adopted laws that are fully gender-neutral—these laws recognize male 
victims of rape and acknowledge that women can physically commit the act 
of rape.34  In order to achieve gender neutrality, jurisdictions have adopted 
an expansive definition of sexual intercourse that includes penetration of the 
vagina, anus, or mouth with a penis, hand, tongue, or inanimate object.35  
These definitions also cover assaults where a woman coerces a man, 
woman, or child to penetrate her in one or more of the ways stipulated.36  
Other jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, have extended the 
definition of rape to include male victims,37 but do not recognize females as 
principal offenders (although women can be convicted as accessories).38  
While most reform jurisdictions do recognize same-sex rape, Indiana is 
unusual in that it has a gender-neutral law that only recognizes rape between 
heterosexuals.39  
Given the significant level of rape law reform that has taken place across 
many jurisdictions, it is interesting to note Novotny’s claim that gender-
specific definitions of rape (involving a male perpetrator and female victim) 
represent, in the United States, the “classic definition.”40  This definition has 
undergone significant revision over the last four decades.  In addition, 
documented awareness of male sexual victimization in the United States 
can be traced back to the early nineteenth century.41  Outside of the United 
States, gender neutrality within rape appears to have a longer history.  For 
example, in China, there was explicit regulation of male rape dating back to 
1740.42  Novotny also appears to suggest that the recognition of male 
victimization was not a goal of rape law reform;43 however, she cites no 
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authority for this claim and, while it might be true in some jurisdictions, this 
description most certainly does not describe the motives behind reform in 
others.44 
The issue of male victimization has also been the subject of discussion in 
the context of the U.S. Model Penal Code (hereinafter “the Code”).  The 
Code’s focus on a gender-specific definition of rape has been justified on 
the following grounds:  
[Although] the male who is forced to engage in intercourse is 
denied freedom of choice in much the same way as the female 
victim of rape . . . [the] . . . potential consequences of coercive 
intimacy [for males] does not seem so grave.  For one thing there is 
no prospect of unwanted pregnancy.  And however devalued 
virginity has become for the modern woman, it would be difficult 
to believe that its loss constitutes comparable injury to the male.45 
The Code’s commentators, according to Susan Estrich, regarded the issue 
of gender neutrality as a “close question.”46  Further, Estrich notes that if 
the Code was being rewritten today it might well be drafted in gender-
neutral language.47  In a recent article, Deborah Denno argues that the Code 
should be updated, stating that: “The male-perpetrator, female-victim 
requirement dates the Code in light of modern attitudes and knowledge 
about the comparable severity of rape involving other gender combinations.  
Given the Commentaries’ own recognition of this inequity, a change to 
gender neutrality is long overdue.”48  Indeed, the Code has been overtaken 
by societal events as well—particularly  court decisions that have 
recognized the incidence of rape outside the male-on-female paradigm.49    
II.  ANALYZING THE CASE AGAINST GENDER NEUTRALITY IN RAPE 
What is readily apparent when reading the critical literature on gender 
neutrality within rape is the wide range of concerns and negative effects 
reportedly identified by its critics.  In this section, I critically examine six 
specific concerns and negative effects that are to be found in Novotny’s 
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article and the work of other critics.  I compare the arguments put forward 
by the critics with the current scholarly literature on male sexual 
victimization in order to judge their persuasiveness.  Given that these 
arguments are at the core of the case against gender-neutral rape statutes, 
this analysis will allow us to judge whether the critics have made a 
convincing case.  
A.  The Growing Recognition of Male Victimization 
A fundamental issue to any discussion of male sexual victimization is the 
seeming unease exhibited by some critics of gender-neutral rape statutes at 
the increasing societal recognition of, and response to, male sexual 
victimization.  Novotny’s discussion of male rape and sexual assault 
illustrates this unease.  At the core of her article is what she sees as the 
“potential consequences—good or ill” of “unsettled” cultural expectations 
regarding sexual violence, including the idea of gender neutrality.50  
Novotny states that “[a] number of recent events, suggesting male co-
optation of the victim category, prompt this inquiry.”51  Included in 
Novotny’s list of events is the increased willingness of males to complain of 
sexual abuse by members of the Catholic Church;52 the “mini-industry” of 
therapists who work with male survivors;53 the increasing number of men 
complaining of sexual harassment;54 and a recent study that found nearly as 
many men reporting unwanted sexual activity as women.55  
Novotny seems to have difficulty with the notion that male victimization 
is something worthy of attention and she appears to take exception to the 
coverage that sexual abuse of boys by Catholic priests has received in the 
media.  While describing the scandal as “interesting,” she states: 
“[e]xploitation of the vulnerable by authority figures is hardly newsworthy.  
Exploitation by Catholic priests, in particular, is an old story to many 
former Catholic schoolgirls.”56  It is regrettable that, given her concern 
about rape and sexual assault, Novotny would argue the sexual abuse of 
boys57 at the hands of Catholic priests, the ongoing slowness of the Church 
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to take effective action, and the subsequent payment of millions of dollars 
in compensation are issues that are “hardly newsworthy.”58  Novotny’s 
stance appears to be that when males are victims, their victimization is not 
worthy of attention, a view occasionally shared by some other legal 
scholars.59   
One might wonder what the reaction would be if Novotny’s analysis were 
to be applied specifically to female victims.  In a recent news story 
concerning the Catholic Church in Northern Ireland, a woman claimed that 
her marriage had fallen apart due to trauma caused by abuse she had 
suffered as a child at the hands of a priest.  Referring to this sexual abuse, 
the priest who refused the woman’s marriage annulment application told her 
“[t]here is undoubtedly a tendency to exaggerate its effects on 
individuals.”60  The comment was defended by the Church that stated: 
“[The priest is] playing devil’s advocate.  He’s not representing the 
church’s attitude.  He’s not going to please everybody.”61  Applying 
Novotny’s apparent view on male victims to a similar circumstance as the 
instant case, one could imagine the justifiable outrage if it were to be 
suggested that such a story was “hardly newsworthy.”  These stories, 
whether they feature male or female victims, signify ongoing institutional 
failures and are a sign that the press is performing a crucial societal function 
by highlighting the abuse of power.  This particular story also indicates a 
further problem—the institutional failure to understand the harm and impact 
of rape and sexual abuse.62     
The recognition of male sexual victimization in the contexts identified by 
Novotny surely suggests, to use her word, a “gain”63 in the struggle against 
sexual assault and harassment.64  As will become apparent, however, the 
tone and content of her article conveys unease at the trend towards gender 
neutrality within rape.  Novotny, like other critics, appears to pit one group 
of victims against another while placing them in a hierarchy of importance.  
Such an approach is particularly unfortunate because it is quite possible to 
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share Novotny’s concern about the plight of female rape victims without 
questioning the recognition of male rape and sexual assault.   
B.  Gender Neutrality as a “Backlash” Against Feminism 
Novotny asks whether gender neutrality is “just another ‘backlash’ 
story?”65 In other words, is the “insistence” that men can be victims too, a 
means of attacking feminist perspectives on rape and sexual assault?  
Novotny is not the first commentator to raise this concern.  Florence Rush, 
writing about the backlash against feminism, recounts being informed about 
a committee created to raise awareness of male rape and campaign for a 
gender-neutral rape law in New York;66 she asks: “Was this group simply 
looking for equal protection under the law or was it telling us that male rape 
is not an issue of sexism because women also rape men?”67  She does not 
explain whether she actually put these questions to the committee or its 
response.  
The backlash argument appears to suggest that gender neutrality in rape 
is inconsistent with feminist principles and, indeed, is an attack on feminist 
analysis of rape.  However, the backlash argument is, in reality, an attempt 
at historic revisionism that shows an ignorance of the history of the feminist 
movement.  Since the 1970s, many feminists have favored the legal 
recognition of male rape, while at the same time being unambiguously 
committed to the needs of female rape victims.68  Further, some prominent 
male commentators who are concerned with male sexual violence and 
victimization have located themselves within a feminist perspective.69  
Another aspect of the backlash argument is the suggestion that gender 
neutrality undermines feminist conceptions of patriarchy.  Novotny asks the 
following questions: “If men are victims of rape, then rape is not a tool of 
patriarchy?  Indeed, is patriarchy itself a figment of feminist 
imagination?”70  I will endeavor to provide an answer to these questions.  
If male power were to be viewed as monolithic, then the recognition of 
male victims might have the implications for feminist analysis that Novotny 
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suggests.  Yet, few commentators see male power (or female victimization) 
in such absolute terms.  The answer to Novotny’s questions is that the 
recognition of male rape and sexual assault does not undermine feminist 
explanations or analysis of sexual violence.  The recognition of male 
victimization, in fact, supports feminist arguments concerning male power.  
Jeanne Gregory and Sue Lees have noted that male and female rape “can 
both be seen as forms of promoting dominant hegemonic heterosexuality.”71  
In earlier work, Lees argued that “to embrace non-consensual buggery of 
men under the same legislation [as women] is not, in my view, to deny the 
relation between rape whether of men or women and male domination, and 
in particular, domination of the particular hegemonic form of macho 
masculinity characteristic of western cultures.”72  
In reality, feminists have long recognized male victimization; however, 
this simple reflection of reality has not prevented them from engaging in an 
analysis of power relations between men and women that highlight issues of 
inequality, victim-blaming, or the extent of female victimization, and nor 
should it.  For example, in her groundbreaking study of female rape, 
Against Our Will: Men, Women and Rape,73 Susan Brownmiller was also 
able to recognize the reality of male victimization:  
While the penis may remain the rapist’s favorite weapon, his prime 
instrument of vengeance, his triumphant display of power, it is not 
in fact his only tool.  Sticks, bottles and even fingers are often 
substituted for the “natural” thing.  And as men may invade 
women through their orifices, so, too, do they invade other men.  
Who is to say that the sexual humiliation suffered through forced 
oral sex or rectal penetration is a lesser violation of the personal, 
private inner space, a lesser injury to mind, spirit and sense of self? 
. . . All the acts of sex forced on unwilling victims deserve to be 
treated in concept as equally grave offenses in the eyes of the law, 
for the avenue of penetration is less significant than the intent to 
degrade.  Similarly, the gravity of the offence ought not to be 
bound by the victim’s gender.  That the law must move in this 
direction seems clear.74 
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Novotny’s reference to patriarchy represents an unsophisticated view of 
male dominance and men’s relative power to that of women.  In raising her 
concerns, Novotny does not acknowledge, as others have, that men can 
exercise power over other males as well as they can over women.  It might 
also be asked why it is not possible to recognize the reality of male power, 
yet at the same time recognize that it is not a singular all-embracing force 
that shapes the lives of all men and women in identical ways, in all 
circumstances.  Indeed, Ngaire Naffine, in a different context, notes that: 
“There are always gaps and dissonances between the dominant view of 
heterosexuality (as pleasurable coercion) and women’s encounters with it 
(which of course are multiplicitous, not singular).”75  If that were not the 
case, it would beg the question as to how it is possible for the work of 
Novotny to even exist?76  The answer, of course, is that no system of 
domination, whether political, economic, or gendered, is absolute.  
Similarly, it becomes very difficult to accept that there is a single reality in 
rape; that is, men rape women and men can never be victimized, or if they 
are, this act has a meaning so different for men that it cannot be labeled as 
rape.  As such, it is submitted that the recognition of male victimization 
does not undermine the notion of patriarchy; it merely acknowledges that 
sexual coercion can also, in a minority of cases, exist in other contexts.  To 
deny this reality creates the danger of theoretical objections to gender 
neutrality in rape, overriding the reality of rape and sexual assault outside 
the male-on-female paradigm.  
C. Gender Neutrality as “Gender Disguise” 
At the center of Novotny’s argument is a clear concern that gender 
neutrality challenges this “gendered paradigm” of rape.77  In her article, she 
appears particularly concerned that gender neutrality will mean that the 
victimization of women will no longer be of central importance when 
considering the problem of rape.  This is a commonly cited theoretical 
argument used by critics, and this section considers its merit.  I will further 
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explore the extent to which the theoretical arguments against gender 
neutrality have support within the wider literature on rape law and male 
victimization.  
Novotny claims: “[G]ender neutrality in rape reform, as is often the case, 
means gender disguise. Without altering the gendered reality of rape itself, 
gender neutrality permitted an understanding of rape different from the 
classic male versus female paradigm.”78  Likewise, Naffine has argued that 
gender neutrality “mystifies” the crime of rape,79 and Catharine MacKinnon 
claims that it is a “cover-up for the gendered reality that . . . [is] . . . really 
going on.”80  In reflecting upon changes in views within the feminist 
movement since the 1970s, MacKinnon has also argued that “[w]hen the 
movement criticized rape, it meant rapists and the point of view that saw 
rape as sex.”81  She argues that gender neutrality shifts the focus away from 
female victimization: “[S]o-called gender neutrality—ignoring what is 
distinctively done to women and ignoring who is doing it—became termed 
the feminist position . . . Gender neutrality means that you cannot take 
gender into account, you cannot recognize, as we once knew we had to, that 
neutrality enforces a non-neutral status quo.”82  
Interestingly, MacKinnon does not apply her analysis of gender neutrality 
to the anti-pornography ordinance drafted by herself and Andrea Dworkin.  
This ordinance explicitly protects women and also states: “In this definition, 
the use of ‘men, children, or transsexuals in the place of women’ is also 
pornography.”83  Indeed, it is a further irony that while MacKinnon 
criticizes post-modernism and its failure to acknowledge the harms caused 
to women as a result of sexual violence, she does exactly this in her 
discussions of gender neutrality as a means of acknowledging male 
victimization.84  
Further, some critics appear to view gender neutrality as a coercive 
mechanism, whereby scholars and others are prevented from focusing their 
attention on the specific needs of female victims of rape.  For example, 
Christine Boyle states:  
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The change to a gender-neutral sexual assault law discourages 
analysis of the law in gender specific terms.  The change was a 
legislative order . . . to stop thinking of sexual assault as something 
men do to women (or to other men, thus putting those other men 
into the degrading position of being treated like a woman).85  
Such objections to gender neutrality are primarily ideologically driven, 
rather than rooted in the experience of rape victims or the scholarly 
literature, which continues to focus overwhelmingly on female 
victimization.  In her evaluation of various rape law reform measures, 
Rosemary Tong has questioned the negative characterization of gender 
neutrality by radical feminists.  She has argued that, to radical feminists, the 
recognition of male rape “deflates the notion that rape is a crime perpetrated 
by men against women,” which could “lead people to believe either that 
rape is no more a problem for women than it is for men or that rape is ‘no 
big thing.’”86  While Tong acknowledges the possibility of this, she argues 
“feminists outside the radical community observe that if rape is understood 
as a crime of the powerful against the less powerful or powerless, then the 
public need not adopt such mistaken beliefs.”87  
The gender disguise argument espoused by scholars such as MacKinnon, 
Novotny, Naffine, and others can be responded to on several grounds.  One 
might ask what precisely is being disguised and from whom?  How does 
gender neutrality do this?  Where is the evidence of this?  Furthermore, if 
such laws are so powerful as to be a form of “legislative order,” how are 
these scholars able to analyze rape in the way in which they do?  Why, if 
these laws “mystify” reality to the extent suggested, do researchers continue 
to focus their efforts overwhelmingly on the rape of females?88  Is there any 
evidence from anywhere that suggests that gender-neutral rape laws mask 
the fact that most rape victims are female and that most of the perpetrators 
are male?  Similarly, is there any evidence that gender-neutral rape laws 
mask the dynamics of female sexual victimization?  Such claims appear to 
give gender-neutral laws an inflated prominence and influence.  Worse, the 
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gender disguise criticisms of gender neutrality appear, for the most part, to 
be largely speculative in nature.  Even where specific claims are made, they 
are not based on any empirically sound basis.  For example, Joan McGregor 
assumes that gender-neutral rape laws must mean that we ignore all the 
knowledge we have acquired of the ways in which men and women react to 
sexual victimization: 
Because women do not necessarily react in the same way as men, 
if gender-neutral statutes mean retaining male norms and reactions 
to rape scenarios, then women will continue to be disadvantaged.  
So, for example, physical resistance might be a typical male 
reaction to attack, but not necessarily a typical female reaction.  
Men are socialized to fight, to respond physically, women are not 
and may respond by, for example, crying or “freezing.”  Subjecting 
women to the resistance requirement therefore disadvantages 
them.89 
In response to this objection, it is worth noting that it is not a typical 
reaction of men to physically resist rape.  As noted by Gillian Mezey and 
Michael King, “[a]lthough it is often assumed that men are able to defend 
themselves, our findings demonstrate that, like women, men react to 
extreme personal threat with frozen helplessness.”90  However, the 
fundamental point here is that even if McGregor’s description were 
accurate, there is no reason why adopting gender-neutral rape definitions 
should require us to ignore gender differences in reactions to rape.  As with 
other critics, McGregor simply misunderstands the nature of gender 
neutrality within rape.  Ultimately, with one exception that will be discussed 
next, these critics are unable to identify any substantive evidence of rape 
being mystified or disguised in any way by gender neutrality.  
There is limited evidence, only cited by two critics, that the gender 
disguise view of gender neutrality may have influenced a court decision that 
could be said to have obscured important issues of gender in judicial 
decision-making.  In R. v. Chase,91 the Court of Appeal for New Brunswick 
held that a Canadian sexual assault law could not be defined to include the 
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touching of a fifteen-year-old girl’s breasts by an intruder.  The court so 
held, inter alia, on the basis that the term “sexual” should primarily be 
limited to the genitals, reasoning that “to include as sexual an assault to the 
parts of the body considered as having secondary sexual characteristics may 
lead to absurd results if one considers a man’s beard.”92  The Canadian 
Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of the New Brunswick court, finding 
that the assault in question was clearly sexual in nature when looking at its 
circumstances and context.93  
The interpretation of the sexual assault provision by the New Brunswick 
court clearly ignored the differing sexual meanings that attach to a man’s 
beard and a woman’s breasts.  As such, it might be argued that this decision 
“disguised” issues of gender.  But does this case actually add support to 
those who oppose gender neutrality in rape?94  Arguably, it does not.  
First, as already noted, the decision was overturned on appeal.  When 
considering judicial decision-making in the context of sexual offences, one 
can identify many decisions that have been subsequently held in error.  
However, this, in itself, is generally not seen to form a solid basis upon 
which to abandon the entire law that is the subject of an overruled judicial 
interpretation.  
Second, the law subject to interpretation in Chase was not a rape law, nor 
was it the most serious sexual assault provision under Canadian law.95  
Indeed, most sexual offence laws are defined in gender-neutral language.  
The logic of the critics’ position, however, is that rather than just 
undermining gender neutrality in rape, the overturned reasoning in Chase 
should support a view that all sexual offences be gender specific.  
Undoubtedly, there are other sexual offences that are primarily committed 
by males against females, and one might speculate that the power relations 
that are linked to rape are also linked to these other offences; for example, 
those involving children.  The critics have yet to explain why gender 
specificity is only desirable in cases of rape.96          
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The critics also fail to acknowledge that gender-neutral reforms are not 
designed to make gender irrelevant in our understanding of sexual violence; 
in fact, gender is central to any understanding of how and why sexual 
violence occurs.  What is clear, however, is that while females are the main 
victims of sexual violence and males the main perpetrators, one still has to 
consider how sexual assaults beyond the male-on-female paradigm are to be 
labeled by the criminal law.  
Gender neutrality within rape is an evidence-led means of appropriately 
labeling criminal conduct.  It is also the case that an acknowledgement that 
men can be victims of rape, and that women can physically commit the act 
of rape, is consistent with a tradition of analysis used by feminists that 
examines issues of context and victim experience.  These are perspectives 
excluded from traditional legal method.  Thus, Naffine argues that 
“traditional legal thinking about the nature of rape and how the law should 
best deal with it depends on outmoded and contested images of women and 
their relations with men.”97  She also argues that legal perceptions of 
women and rape “are both clearly pronounced and poorly informed. They 
take little account of the considerable empirical and theoretical literature . . . 
on the meaning of the crime to women.”98  
One can equally argue that in the last two decades, our understanding of 
male rape and sexual assault has grown so “contested and outmoded” that 
images of male victims can no longer go unchallenged.  Thus, drawing on 
wider perspectives not only assists our understanding of female rape, it is 
also essential in our understanding of how the legal process deals and 
should deal with male victims of rape and sexual assault.99  It is somewhat 
ironic that feminist critics of gender neutrality (rightly) criticize the legal 
process for failing to properly address and understand the experiences of 
female victims, yet they make the same mistake in their analysis of legal 
responses to male victimization. 
Another variation on the gender disguise argument is the suggestion that 
gender-neutral rape statutes ignore the differing power relations between 
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men and women.  In the context of English law, Terri Gillespie argued that 
“to refer to ‘non-consensual buggery’ as the same as female rape (i.e., that 
the crime is gender neutral), is to render invisible the gendered power 
relations between men and women expressed through men’s sexual violence 
to women.”100  As is customary amongst critics, Gillespie does not explain 
how gender neutrality renders gendered power relations “invisible,” nor 
does she give any examples of this happening in jurisdictions with gender-
neutral rape laws.  In any case, the issue of “gendered power relations,” 
where the victim is female, may be relevant when considering men as the 
perpetrators of sexual violence, and it may help to explain why and how 
rape occurs.  However, in terms of labeling male victimization, it is a stretch 
to link “men’s sexual violence to women” and the exclusion of male victims 
from the remit of rape.  It is evident that males, like females, experience a 
wide range of pressures and coercion that may operate to vitiate consent for 
the purposes of rape.101  Gillespie, however, does not explain why her 
notion of “gendered power relations” cannot be relevant to the analysis of 
male sexual violence against other males.  
On the basis of what we know of men’s experiences of rape and sexual 
assault, along with the evidence that exists on how male sexual consent is 
constructed within the legal process, there appear to be similarities between 
male and female rape.102  In fact, there appears to be no current evidence to 
suggest that “gendered power relations” differ so greatly in male and female 
rape to justify the different legal labelling of those experiences by the 
criminal law.  In the legal sphere, it would, of course, be naïve to assume 
that notions of consent, submission, acquiescence, or agreement will be 
constructed in identical ways in all cases of male and female rape.  There 
are likely to be differences, for example, because facts and defence tactics 
vary between cases, just as there are likely to be differences between cases 
where the victims are of the same gender.  In addition, there may also be 
societal attitudes that attribute blame or responsibility for sexual violence to 
victims because of their gender and sexual orientation.  Such beliefs are 
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potentially important in the construction of notions of consent within the 
legal process.103  However, while some societal perceptions of male and 
female rape differ, the current literature suggests that many people’s beliefs 
around male and female rape tend to be poorly informed.  In addition, 
people often blame victims, male or female, for their experiences of rape.104  
Consequently, given many of the similarities in male and female sexual 
victimization,105 it appears that any differences in “gendered power 
relations” do not justify labelling the crimes differently under the law.   
It would appear that those opposed to gender neutrality within rape 
incorrectly assume that the concept means ignoring gender in rape and that 
the incidence and context of female rape cannot be considered relevant 
under gender neutrality.  Significantly, the critics can provide no sources to 
support their claim.  Rather, their views appear linked to a debate that has 
occurred between feminists who believe in formal equality—that is, gender 
neutrality—and those feminists who are critical of formal equality because 
it fails, they argue, to effectively address issues of social and gender 
inequality106 and, indeed, is positively harmful to women.107  
It is apparent that feminists opposed to formal equality do not distinguish 
its use in differing areas of law.  There are legitimate concerns about the 
impact of formal equality in some areas of law because “facially sex-neutral 
rules often contribute significantly to the maintenance of the existing 
system of sex differentiation.”108  Clearly, it is possible that gender-neutral 
laws may fail to acknowledge and address inequalities that may impact, for 
example, some fields of law.  However, in the context of rape, gender 
neutrality is neither undermining the substantive equality of women nor are 
women being harmed by it.  Instead, it is a simple recognition of reality—
men sometimes fall victim to the same or at least very similar acts to those 
suffered by women.  Thus, it is dangerous to take a critical broad brush to 
formal equality in the form of gender neutrality and simply assume it has a 
negative impact in all contexts.   
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D. Gender Neutrality as Equal Victimization 
A further argument against gender neutrality in rape rests upon the claim 
that it implies men and women are equally victimized, or are equally likely 
to commit rape.  As with many of their other assertions, critics are unable to 
offer evidence to support this claim.  This section considers how gender 
neutrality critics construct this particular argument and also draws on the 
experience of England in adopting a gender-neutral rape statute to find out 
whether the equal victimization claim is in evidence.   
Novotny notes that in “Washington, as in many states, the crime of rape 
may be committed if the victim is rendered mentally incapable of consent, 
whether through the abuse of alcohol or drugs, or for some other reason.”109  
After setting out Washington’s law on incapacity of consent, Novotny refers 
to the response of some of her students during classroom discussions to the 
notion of gender neutrality, stating: “Some of my students argue that if both 
parties are intoxicated, either both are guilty or not guilty of the crime . . . .  
More remarkable . . . is that my students posit a gender blind ‘date-rape’ 
landscape, one inhabited by as many potential male as female victims.”110  
The problem with this analysis, however, is that from what Novotny 
recounts of her students’ comments, they do not appear to be arguing that 
there may be as many male as female victims of rape.  Her students’ 
scenario is limited to discussing one incident involving two people.  
Novotny’s students appear to say nothing about the wider incidence of rape 
and sexual assault.  In any case, the problem inherent within her students’ 
hypothetical is not so much in the issue of gender neutrality, but in the fact, 
as Novotny points out, that there is no mens rea requirement for rape in 
Washington that makes the hypothetical more likely to occur.111  Though, of 
course, it would still require both parties to claim non-consent and if that 
were ever the case, then presumably both parties would be criminally liable.  
Either way, exactly the same problem could arise in the context of non-
sexual assaults or a multitude of other offences. 
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In a variation on the equal victimization argument put forward by 
Novotny, Rush has also claimed that gender neutrality is “a useful tool in an 
attempt to establish that women are as guilty as men for the offences 
attributed to them.”112  Similarly, Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan claim 
to have identified law commission reports and judicial opinions that “give 
the impression that rape is as likely to be committed by women as           
men . . . .”113  It has to be said that this is a strained interpretation of the 
sources to which they refer and it is perhaps unsurprising that they do not 
cite any passages from law commission reports and judicial opinions to 
support such an interpretation.  Indeed, one could equally argue that these 
sources did not explicitly recognize the classic male-on-female paradigm 
because this paradigm is assumed.  When one examines the reasons why 
gender-neutral reforms have been introduced, it is impossible to find any 
suggestion by a court, legal scholar, or reform body that men and women 
are equally victimized or that they are equally likely to victimize.  Indeed, 
the reality that most victims are female has been explicitly recognized.114  In 
fact, the only place where the equal victimization/victimizer claims can be 
found is in the work of critics such as Novotny, Graycar, Morgan, and 
Rush. 
Novotny goes on to refer to the “surprising results”115 of a study by Mary 
Larimer et al.116 in which men and women were asked about their 
experiences of non-consensual sex.  The study found that 20.7 percent of 
men and 27.5 percent of women “reported being the recipients of one or 
more of . . . five types of unwanted sexual contact.”117  Some other studies 
have also found roughly equal reporting rates of unwanted sexual contact 
for men and women.118  These studies do suggest that non-consensual 
sexual contact is widespread and that clearly men, as well as women, can be 
victims.  However, this does not mean that men and women’s experiences 
represent, in Novotny’s words, a “gender-symmetrical view of rape”;119 this 
is only possible if one is prepared to decontextualize research findings.  In 
order to judge the prevalence of rape from such research, one would have to 
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examine the meaning of such experiences to the participants, the nature of 
the sexual contact, and the circumstances in which the unwanted contact 
took place.  Given the seriousness of the crime of rape, such an analysis is 
crucial in terms of how “unwanted sexual contact” is labeled by the 
criminal law.   
In the midst of the various claims made by the critics of gender 
neutrality, it is worth comparing these criticisms with the experiences of 
jurisdictions that have adopted gender-neutral reforms.  In this respect, 
reforms to English rape law that led to the recognition of male victimization 
are instructive.  Prior to 1994, cases of non-consensual, penile-anal sex 
between adult males were labeled as non-consensual buggery with a 
maximum penalty of ten years of imprisonment, in contrast to the offence of 
rape, which attracts a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.120  Indeed, it 
was argued that English criminal law had traditionally been primarily 
concerned with the regulation of consensual male homosexual behavior 
rather than recognizing men as victims of serious sexual assaults.121   
In 1994, the offence of rape was extended to cover cases involving non-
consensual, penile-anal intercourse with either a male or female victim.122  
Those who supported this change did so on several grounds.  It was argued 
that the function of rape law was to protect people from serious violations 
of their sexual autonomy and that there were clear similarities in victim 
trauma between non-consensual vaginal and anal intercourse.123  The 
proponents also argued that a change in the law would mean that anal rape 
would be treated with appropriate seriousness in terms of sentencing and 
labeling, as well as providing recognition of the problem.124  Recently, 
similar arguments have been made in favor of the recognition of male rape 
under Scottish law.125  Neither of the equal victimizer/victimization claims 
made by the critics of gender neutrality are supported by the experience of 
law reform in England.     
Interestingly, this amendment to English law has recently attracted 
criticism from a novel perspective.  Ruth Graham claims that “the discourse 
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that led up to the 1994 amendment suggests that the penetration of the male 
body is the important violation, rather than the violation of the anus (male 
or female) . . . how is it that the penetration of the male anus is 
privileged?”126  She also objects to a characterization of this amendment 
made during the Parliamentary debates in the House of Lords by Lord 
Ponsonby of Shulbrede, who stated that the amendment was “related to 
male rape.”127  Graham also makes reference to the “almost exclusive focus 
on anal rape of men, rather than on anal rape in general” in discussions prior 
to the 1994 amendment,128 and explains this focus by using the work of 
Judith Butler, noting that “[p]enetration of the female body remains less 
‘shocking’ than that of the male body . . . In this context, the focus on the 
anal rape of men becomes more understandable, though not excusable.”129  
This would appear to be another criticism driven by theory that attempts to 
portray gender-neutral reforms as problematic; however, the reality is quite 
different because Graham inaccurately characterizes the discourse that gave 
rise to the amendment.  In the context of the Parliamentary debates, there 
are repeated references to the anal rape of women, particularly in the House 
of Lords, where most of the discussions on the amendment took place.130  In 
addition, Graham’s criticism of Lord Ponsonby is inaccurate and taken out 
of context.  He did, indeed, make brief reference to male rape because, as he 
explained, “[t]he idea of male rape may well be unthinkable to many of 
your Lordships, as it is to me.”131  In these debates, he also made reference 
to female victims of anal rape,132 as did other Lords.133  There was even a 
suggestion that anal rape may be more traumatic for women than for 
men.134  Graham does not acknowledge these points; by misconstruing key 
debates that gave rise to the 1994 amendment, Graham appears, like other 
critics, to be guided more by theory than by evidence.      
E.  Has Gender Neutrality Damaged the Legal Response to Rape? 
Some scholars have argued that gender neutrality has undermined the 
impact of rape law reform.  Novotny shares this concern and poses two 
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related questions: “[T]o the extent the feminist challenge rightly and 
necessarily intended its beneficiaries to be female, has it been undermined 
by a rising tide of male victims?  By gender neutralizing the victim position, 
have we gained or lost ground in the struggle against sexual assault and 
harassment?”135  Novotny does not explain how the societal and legal 
response to rape could be undermined by the “rising tide of male victims,” 
but it is worth examining some of the evidence that explains why the effects 
of rape law reform have been “disappointing.”136  
There is a growing literature that details the limited impact reforms have 
had on improving the conviction rate in cases of rape and the treatment of 
rape complainants by the criminal justice process.  Unfortunately, Novotny 
does not engage in any detailed discussion of such findings, though she 
does briefly refer to two studies on the impact of reform.  If she had 
examined these studies in detail, along with a vast range of other research, 
she would find that there are a multitude of reasons for the failure of rape 
law reform, none of which have anything to do with gender neutrality.137  
For example, many studies have found that the attitudes and practices of 
criminal justice professionals have undermined reform measures.  In the 
context of the Michigan reforms, Marsh et al., in the book Rape and the 
Limits of Law Reform, noted that “there are junctures in the investigation at 
which the rape victim confronts a unique scepticism in the form of 
institutionalized policies and practices the law did not address.  These 
reflect both enduring myths about the crime and unchallenged bureaucratic 
routines.”138   
In their detailed study of rape within the U.S. criminal justice system, 
David Bryden and Sonja Lengnick identify several factors that lead to rape 
case attrition and note that “although official bias has played an important 
role, most rape-case attrition appears to be due to a combination of the 
victim’s unwillingness to seek legal redress, the prosecution’s burden of 
proof in criminal cases, and jurors’ attitudes.”139  In a study of the effects of 
reform in several U.S. states, Spohn and Horney found that “in most of the 
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jurisdictions we studied, the reforms had no impact. . . . We found, like 
many others who have studied reforms aimed at the court system, that the 
rape law reforms placed few constraints on the tremendous discretion 
exercised by the decision makers in the criminal justice system.”140   
Some scholars have engaged in misrepresentation of sources in an 
attempt to blame gender neutrality for the failure of rape law reform.  For 
example, Kwong–Leung Tang, in her article on rape law reform in Canada, 
has claimed that Canadian gender-neutral laws are “superficial and that they 
work to the detriment of women by minimizing the harm of rape.”141  Tang 
cites to Leah Cohen and Connie Backhouse as authority for this assertion;142 
however, upon consulting this source we find that the authors do make the 
point Tang claims, but not in the context of gender neutrality.  For example, 
they do talk about the reforms minimizing harm, but in the context of 
proposed sentencing reductions that have nothing whatsoever to do with 
gender neutrality.143     
A variation on the claim that gender neutrality has damaged the legal 
response to rape is the suggestion that gender neutrality is an ineffective 
means of addressing the problem of rape.  Annabelle Mooney recently 
argued that gender neutrality “will not, of itself, change attitudes and 
behaviour . . . [for change] to occur requires not only linguistic but 
institutional and social reform.  The gender problem is not simply one of 
representation, but one of experience lived and corporeal.”144  Such an 
assertion is not wholly inaccurate; it is, undoubtedly, the case that legal 
reform on its own cannot solve the problem of sexual violence, as clearly 
demonstrated by the evidence of the impact of legal reform discussed 
earlier.145  Indeed, this point has been recognized in some reform 
jurisdictions.  For example, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has 
stressed that “we must recognize that the criminal law can serve only a 
limited function and should not be regarded as a replacement for other 
social controls.”146  Mooney’s criticism, however, has nothing to do with 
gender neutrality within rape.  She fails to consider why gender-neutral rape 
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laws were introduced147 and appears to criticize gender neutrality for not 
performing some miraculous improvement in the treatment of rape cases by 
the criminal justice system.  Yet, that is not the aim of gender neutrality; 
hence, gender-neutral reforms have been accompanied by a wide range of 
definitional and procedural reforms, along with attempts to change the 
attitudes and practices of those working within the criminal justice system.  
Mooney appears to unintentionally acknowledge this point by proposing 
several changes to improve the law’s response to rape, as well as suggesting 
the need for “the re-evaluation of our understanding of crime, justice, and 
the institutions that deal with it.”148  Further, her analysis becomes confused 
when she states, “I by no means want to suggest that men are not raped,”149 
and “[n]otwithstanding men are also raped . . . .”150  Such an 
acknowledgement begs the question, how should these “rapes” be labeled 
by the criminal law?  Unfortunately, other than suggesting that men are 
“gendered female in such a crime,”151 she provides no explanation as to 
how such crimes should be classified.  
F. Do Men and Women “Experience Sexual Assault Differently”? 
Some critics of gender-neutral definitions of rape claim that men and 
women experience sexual assault in significantly different ways and, 
therefore, gender neutrality detracts from the unique experiences of women 
who have been raped.  Novotny shares this criticism of gender neutrality, 
but fails to address the scholarly research on male victimization that 
provides evidence to the contrary.  This failure is illustrated by Novotny’s 
discussion of the impact of rape and sexual assault on male victims.  In 
what is, at the very least, an overstatement, Novotny claims: “As one 
consequence of the centrality of gender to sexual assault, men and women 
experience sexual assault differently, according to social psychologists.”152  
In this section, I will examine Novotny’s claims in light of the current 
literature on the impact of rape on male victims. 
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Novotny bases her  claim that “men and woman experience sexual assault 
differently” on the single assertion that men’s sense of masculinity is 
challenged by rape, whereas in the cases of female victims it “reinforce[s] a 
heterosexual normative feminine self-concept for women.”153  While this 
particular description of victim reactions is accurate,154 Novotny’s 
characterization of reactions to rape is extremely narrow.  In reality, there 
are marked similarities in the responses of adult men and women to rape.  
Novotny neglects to examine the full range of victim responses, including 
physical, emotional, and psychological reactions, along with attempts by 
victims to normalize or minimize their experiences.155  This is not to say 
that all victims experience rape in the same way, but, on the basis of the 
current literature, there are clear similarities.156  In terms of differences,  
within the same gender group there are wide variations between the 
reactions of individual victims to rape.   
In the context of male rape, distinctions can also be made between the 
effects of attacks by women and those by men.  While some men who are 
sexually assaulted by women can and do suffer severe trauma,157 male 
victims in such cases appear to report fewer negative reactions than women 
who are raped by men.158  One also has to recognize that, as with female 
victims,159 there may be particular issues faced by men who are raped by 
partners or acquaintances (for example, problems of trust and an inability to 
escape an abusive relationship), that are not faced by men raped by 
strangers.160  This is a specific area that requires further inquiry as it has 
been noted that this issue is “perhaps the most understudied topic in same-
sex domestic violence.”161  In contrast, there are much clearer and well-
established parallels between male and female victims where the assailant is 
male.162  Thus, male and female rape can be seen as having serious, long-
term psychological and emotional trauma for victims.163  In order to judge 
Novotny’s claim that “men and women experience sexual assault 
differently,” one also has to take account of recent research that examined 
sexual assault within lesbian relationships.164  In a series of interviews 
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conducted with lesbians who had been sexually assaulted by other women, 
Girshick found that they were victims of a range of penetrative and non-
penetrative, non-consensual sex acts.  In comparing these women’s 
reactions to those of women sexually assaulted by male dates or 
acquaintances, Girshick found clear and pronounced similarities.165    
Within the U.S. courts, there has also been recognition of the similarities 
between male and female victimization.  In People v. Yates,166 Justice Shea 
acknowledged the existence of “Male Rape Trauma Syndrome,” and 
concluded:  
A review of literature describing the effect of sexual assault on 
men reveals that male victims, both heterosexual and homosexual, 
exhibit a well defined trauma syndrome parallel to that found in 
female victims of rape. . . . Nothing in the peculiar reactions of 
male victims of sexual assault places them outside the medical 
definition of post-traumatic stress disorder [as recognized in cases 
involving female victims] or diminishes the validity of the 
conclusion that a syndrome of male sexual victimization is 
accepted in the scientific community.167    
Where does this analysis lead us?  First, it is worth noting that there are 
differences in the way rape is experienced by individuals as well as by 
groups taking into account such factors as gender, sexuality, and the identity 
of the assailant.  However, there appears to be no support within the 
scholarly literature for Novotny’s blanket assertion that “men and women 
experience sexual assault differently”; instead, there are marked similarities.  
Furthermore, the differences between the experiences of men and women 
(for example, the challenging of men’s sense of masculinity in cases of 
male rape) do not provide any obvious basis for arguing that male rape 
should be labeled as distinct from female rape by the criminal law.    
III. CONCLUSION 
The work of those who criticize gender neutrality within rape lacks 
sufficient or informed analysis.  Novotny and other critics do not offer a 
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solid, empirically based argument.  The claim that gender neutrality does 
not allow for the examination of gender when discussing rape is not the 
purpose or the effect of gender neutrality within rape.  In addition, some 
critics, relying either on misrepresentation of evidence or no evidence at all, 
seek to construct an “ideological projection” in which they claim gender 
neutrality harms women.168  If the critics were correct, and gender neutrality 
harmed women or meant the exclusion of issues of gender from discussions 
about rape, they would have a justifiable concern.  In reality, it is difficult to 
imagine a responsible discussion of rape that does not consider all issues 
relating to gender and the realities of sexual violence faced by both women 
and men.  
Another aspect of the critics’ analytical failure is that they are largely 
unable to identify any benefits that gender neutrality might hold for victims 
of rape and sexual assault.  Graycar and Morgan, for example, ask, “[c]an 
you see any advantages in having a gender-neutral sexual assault law?”169  
Yet, they make no attempt to answer this question.  In addition, the critics 
appear to not critically think about their own arguments, nor raise any 
evidential concerns.  This is a significant failure given that I have 
demonstrated that many of the criticisms of gender neutrality fail for want 
of evidence.  Ultimately, and despite the unwillingness of the critics to 
acknowledge this fact, gender neutrality within rape is concerned with the 
appropriate labeling of criminal behavior.  The “insistence,” as Novotny 
describes it, of those who favor gender neutrality is to challenge outdated 
legal codes that attach to sexual assault inappropriate labels and inadequate 
sanctions and to provide a more informed legal response to male 
victimization.  Many of the critics, in their work, refer to the needs of 
female victims and discuss how the criminal law has traditionally excluded 
women’s experiences and perspectives.  One might think, therefore, that the 
critics would have a greater understanding when similar attempts are made 
to assist male victims of rape and sexual assault.  
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Graham, in her recent contribution to the debate around gender neutrality, 
illustrates the trend of gender neutrality opponents’ unwillingness to engage 
in self-criticism.  In this work Graham states:  
The current research evidence remains largely exploratory, and ill 
suited to support the claims to empirical reality they use in their 
argument for gender-neutrality in the law of rape.  We need to 
better understand what ‘male rape’ means and the implications for 
sexual assault more broadly, rather than seeking to contribute to 
established theoretical debates on the basis of flimsy definitions of 
sexual harm.170 
On many levels this is an inversion of reality.  As already made clear, it is 
those who favor gender-specific rape laws who lack credible evidence or 
arguments.  Graham makes no effort to consider the arguments surrounding 
gender neutrality; thus, how she is able to summarily dismiss the case for 
gender neutrality is unclear.  If examined more closely, Graham would have 
to concede that many of the arguments against gender neutrality do not 
withstand scrutiny.171  Indeed, some of these arguments require no 
discussion of male rape at all in order to be fully dismissed.172 
This article has focused primarily on male victimization, but many 
gender-neutral laws have recognized that women can also physically 
commit the act of rape.  The traditional invisibility of these sexual assaults 
in law is reflected, in part, by a historic denial on the part of scholarship and 
court decisions that such assaults even occur.173  Understanding of sexual 
offending by women is growing; as such, legal discussion and analysis 
should take into account these new understandings.  If we are to be a society 
that takes sexual violence seriously, then it is important we recognize all 
victims and perpetrators of rape.  It is also of central importance to this 
process of recognition that sexual violence is correctly labeled by the 
criminal law.  This can and should be achieved—while recognizing the fact 
that most victims are female174 and that there are important issues of gender 
to consider in understanding the causes of rape—in our responses to victims 
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and in the enforcement of the criminal law.  It has yet to be convincingly 
argued, however, that these wider understandings should lead to the 
exclusion of male victims (or female perpetrators) from the definition of 
rape.  
Finally, the mistaken characterization of gender neutrality by critics as 
something sinister or dangerous highlights the way in which theory-driven 
argument can become detached from reality.  Janice Richardson, when 
recently commenting on the work of Foucault and Deleuze, and the 
relationship between theory and practice, stated:  
Theory and practice can be viewed as relays such that sometimes 
theory is blocked by the need to be informed by practice. . . . I 
agree theory can be blocked by not listening to “minor” discourses 
(i.e. to what actually happens at the sharp end of oppression) or by 
blindly applying monocausal or ahistorical “grand theories” of 
oppression to all situations . . . .175 
Although Richardson is not discussing the plight of male rape victims 
here, her analysis is useful because it goes some way to describing the 
approach of feminist critics to gender neutrality within rape.  The theoretical 
objections to gender neutrality that have been surveyed in this article are not 
informed by practice or empirical evidence.  For example, the claim that 
gender neutrality has undermined rape law reform is not supported by 
evidence.176  Critics have failed to listen to counter evidence and have been 
reluctant to engage in self-criticism.  Whether male victims (or indeed, 
female victims assaulted by other women) might constitute a “minor 
discourse” is open to debate.  They might be included as a minor discourse 
because men perpetrate most rapes and most victims are female.  Further, 
their experiences might be viewed as a minor discourse because the 
evidence examining their victimization has been almost completely ignored 
by the critics.  In addition, male rape victims can be seen as experiencing 
the “sharp end of oppression.”  It can also be argued that the critics are 
guilty of blindly applying their theoretical objections to gender neutrality 
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without considering either the strength of their arguments or the accuracy of 
their characterisations.  It is high time that the reality of sexual victimisation 
for all those who suffer its pain and degradation be our concern when 
defining criminal acts. The pursuit of theory has its place, but not at the cost 
of recognizing the reality of rape for all its victims. 
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